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Local Government Finance as 
Integrated System: The Uneasy Case 
for Using Special Districts in Real 
Estate Finance (A Response to Odinet’s 
Super-Liens to the Rescue? A Case 




Local governments have long used special financing districts 
to build infrastructure. If a local project, say building a pocket 
park, is likely to increase the values of properties very close to the 
park, then why should those properties not pay for the park in the 
first place? Though efficient and fair in many cases, the use of 
these districts can also be problematic. For instance, it seems 
likely that wealthier residents, with higher property values to 
leverage, are especially likely to use these districts effectively. It 
has also been the case that developers have used these districts 
speculatively, which had serious repercussions during the last 
recession. Christopher Odinet develops an additional, and 
important, critique of these districts. Odinet observes that these 
districts obtain a lien on benefiting properties, and that this lien 
takes priority over the liens of conventional lenders. Odinet then 
argues that this super-priority should only be honored if the 
district has served some substantial public purpose.   
In this short Response, I agree with Odinet that these districts 
are problematic, but wonder whether his solution is the best one. 
This is because traditional lenders will generally know about 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law and Political Science, U.C. Davis. All mistakes are my 
own. 
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these districts before lending. Furthermore, his solution only kicks 
in if there is an event of default, which is unusual, and thus, this 
solution does not do much to counter the run of the mill socio-
economic stratification that these districts often enable. I argue 
that an ex ante approach limiting the use of these districts 
therefore seems preferable. I conclude with the argument that, 
despite all their flaws, these districts should not be abolished 
outright. Local government finance is a dynamic system and the 
absence of any tool, even one prone to abuse, can have severe 
consequences, as illustrated by the recent history of California. 
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I. Introduction 
We are usually aware of the general-purpose local 
governments that we live and work in—primarily counties and 
cities. We are often aware of some special-purpose local 
government entities, particularly school districts. We are 
probably not aware, however, of the many other special districts 
that abound in most states—water districts, utility districts, 
transportation districts, irrigation districts, and mosquito 
abatement districts, to name a few. According to the Census 
Bureau, in 2012, there were over 51,000 of such districts in the 
United States—more than the over 39,000 general-purpose 
governments.1 
The Census Bureau undercounted. The Census Bureau’s 
criteria leave out many special districts with significant powers 
that are not sufficiently autonomous to make the Bureau’s list.2 
                                                                                                     
 1. 2012 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU GOV’T ORG. SUMMARY REP. 1 (2013). 
 2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G12-CG-ISD, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS: 
2012, at vi (2013). 
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For instance, in California, the Census Bureau counted 2,861 
special districts (other than school districts),3 while California 
itself, which has somewhat looser criteria, counted 4,711 of such 
special districts—and all of those districts wielded significant 
fiscal power.4 
The existence of these districts can be viewed from a number 
of perspectives. Looked at positively, they represent sensible 
attempts to achieve economies of scale or bring expertise to bear 
on a technical problem. Looked at negatively, such districts 
greatly complicate democratic accountability, and, indeed, they 
are often formed to evade limits, particularly as to incurring debt, 
that have been imposed by the people on the forms of government 
with which they are more familiar. 
There is another kind of special district, one not accounted 
for by either the Census Bureau or the California State 
Controller, and this kind is perhaps as numerous as the special-
purpose districts just described. This is the sublocal tax or 
assessment district.5 A sublocal district is typically formed by a 
general-purpose local government, such as a city or county, but 
can also be formed by other entities, particularly school districts. 
Almost no one is aware of whether or not they live in “City of X, 
Assessment District # 2012-1.”   
                                                                                                     
 3. Id. at 24. 
 4. 2012 CAL. STATE CONTROLLER SPECIAL DISTRICTS ANN. REP. iii. 
 5. How much more numerous is hard to say. As of 2012–2013, the 
California Debt Investment and Advisory Commission counted 891 of one type 
of these districts with debt outstanding. CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, 
CDIAC No. 14.11, CALIFORNIA MELLO-ROOS COMMUNITY FACILITY DISTRICTS 
YEARLY FISCAL STATUS REP. 2012–2013 (2013). Not all of such districts have 
outstanding debt, and in California, there are other kinds of very similar 
districts. For more on trying to get a handle on the scope of these districts, see 
Christopher K. Odinet, Super-Liens to the Rescue? A Case Against Special 
Districts in Real Estate Finance, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 735–46 (2015) 
(setting forth the argument regarding special districts that the current Article 
responds to); Darien Shanske, Note, Public Tax Dollars for Private Suburban 
Development: A First Report on a National Phenomenon, 26 VA. TAX REV. 709, 
711–12, 721–23 (2007) (providing a general analysis of Mello-Roos Tax Bonds). 
See generally Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS to Pin Down the Truth 
About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2007) (discussing Texas 
districts and similar normative arguments on both sides). 
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The rationale for these sublocal districts is slightly different 
from the rationale for more independent special-purpose entities, 
such as water districts.6 Take a classic case: a road needs to be 
built that connects a particular parcel of residential property to 
the main town. Suppose as well, to make the case easier, that this 
parcel is on a cul de sac and is at the end of the road. Without 
doubt, this property benefits from this road more than anyone 
else’s, likely in a monetizable way. When the owner sells her 
property, now connected by a road, it will be worth more thanks 
to this public improvement. But why should the rest of the public 
pay for an improvement that so clearly benefits a particular 
property? Should general tax dollars not be saved for projects 
that provide more general benefits, such as, in this case, perhaps 
the larger road that many people will use in order to get to the 
smaller road that ends in the property owner’s cul de sac? A 
sublocal district—usually called an assessment district—
responds to this concern by creating a mechanism whereby the 
localizable value to be created by a public improvement can be 
harnessed to build the improvement in the first place.  
Thus, in this classic case, the government will place an 
assessment on the owner’s property to pay for her share of the 
road, say $10,000, payable $1,000 year over ten years. Because 
the government is fairly certain that she will pay this $10,000 on 
schedule, it can borrow against these expected payments on very 
favorable terms in order to build the road. The government knows 
that it will collect this assessment because it will be collected 
along with property taxes, and, like a property tax, payment will 
be secured by a lien on the owner’s property. As a tax lien, it will 
take priority over other liens.7 
The use of such sublocal financings was once very common, 
with special assessment revenue making up a sizable portion of 
the revenue of major cities.8 Currently, assessments are still 
                                                                                                     
 6. See generally Darien Shanske, Putting the California Constitution 
(Back) to Work: A Blueprint for Clearing Legal Roadblocks to Proper 
Infrastructure Finance, 54 ST. TAX NOTES 567 (2009) (developing this argument 
further). 
 7. Odinet, supra note 5, at 749–50. 
 8. See Darien Shanske, Attention Carbon Auditors: There’s Low-Hanging 
Fruit in the PAB Regs, 127 TAX NOTES 693, 705–07 (2010) (providing an 
overview of “the admittedly long history of assessment financing”); Stephen 
Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special 
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common, though much less so, and predominantly they are used 
to build infrastructure for new developments. Such speculative 
use of assessments is not new and, in fact, is one of the reasons 
their popularity declined during, and after, the Great 
Depression.9 Therefore, one issue raised by these districts is to 
what extent they encourage harmful speculation. 
These sublocal districts have begun to resemble other kinds 
of special districts in that they sometimes undertake limited 
governmental functions within the new development area. Given 
that these districts are put in place by developers for their own 
benefit, the assumption by the district of governmental roles 
poses normative challenges, such as whether it is appropriate for 
some people to get “less” local democracy than others because of 
how a developer once set up the community’s governance 
structure.10 More fundamentally, there is the question of how the 
tools of local democracy are used in establishing sublocal 
districts. Because of the great flexibility usually available in 
designing, forming, and confirming these districts, it is easy for 
interested groups, beyond developers, to manipulate them.11 In 
sum, there is a multi-headed democratic challenge posed by such 
districts.12 
                                                                                                     
Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 202 (1983) 
(noting when special assessments originated in certain states and how they 
became increasingly common financing devices in the early 19th Century).  
 9. Diamond, supra note 8, at 240. 
 10. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 751–53 (noting the strikingly low 
participation in district board elections). See generally Nadav Shoked, Quasi-
Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971 (2013) (explaining how special districts that 
function like cities often undermine the objectives of local government law). 
 11. See Vladimir Kogan & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Problem With Being 
Special: Democratic Values and Special Assessments, 14 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & 
POL’Y 4, 30 (2009) (“[T]hough the institutional structures of modern assessments 
do appear to prevent downward redistribution, they leave the system vulnerable 
to strategic manipulation by large property owners and businesses, who can 
more easily overcome the problems of collective action, in effect transforming 
assessments into a potential tool for upward redistribution.”). 
 12. There are also federal tax challenges. See Darien Shanske, The Feds 
Are Already Here: The Federal Role in Regulating Municipal Debt Finance, 33 
B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 795, 805–09 (2014) (discussing a challenge actually 
raised by the IRS). See generally Shanske, supra note 8 (arguing that these 
districts should be challenged on other federal tax grounds). 
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There are other related reasons one might be concerned 
about such districts. If they are particularly good at building 
infrastructure in undeveloped areas, as they seem to be, then 
they are tools for sprawl pattern development. Sprawl pattern 
development causes environmental and socio-economic problems. 
After all, it will be the wealthy who are likely most able to self-
finance the improvements that they would like, in splendid 
isolation.13  
II. Odinet’s Argument 
In his analysis of these districts,14 Odinet places them in 
much the same context as outlined above,15 though, crucially, he 
adds one additional, novel, and very interesting critique: sublocal 
districts used to finance real estate improvements cause problems 
for traditional lenders because these districts obtain a lien that is 
superior to the lien obtained by the traditional lender.16 Odinet’s 
proposed judicial balancing test would mitigate this problem. His 
test even takes into account many of the normative concerns with 
these districts already adduced.17 Specifically, if challenged in 
court, the priority of the development district loan would depend 
on whether the district provided a community benefit that 
justified this priority. 
Odinet’s analysis fails, however, to justify its concern for 
traditional lenders. Odinet explains the long history of special 
districts,18 as well as their prevalence in many regions. It is, 
therefore, difficult to see how traditional lenders are being 
blindsided. Indeed, Odinet also explains why these districts are 
                                                                                                     
 13. See generally Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local 
Government Law as a Cause (and Solution) to the Current Financial Crisis, 43 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663 (2010) (explaining how wealthy homeowners 
generally use zoning and other tools to isolate themselves from other socio-
economic groups). 
 14. Odinet, supra note 5. 
 15. Odinet arguably assimilates these districts too much to special districts 
more broadly. 
 16. Odinet, supra note 5, at 753–73. 
 17. Id. at 785–88. 
 18. Id. at 737–46. 
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so favorable for developers.19 Because this is usually the case—for 
example, where the district does not fail—the traditional lenders 
likely share in the benefit that the developer enjoys through 
being permitted to use a governmental structure to finance 
essentially private development.20  
It could be countered that sublocal financing of this sort is 
inherently unstable, and thus, a downturn could materialize and 
undermine traditional lenders. This is the concern, noted above, 
that these districts are too likely to encourage speculation. Many 
thought, including this commentator, that speculative land-
secured districts would fall like dominoes during a prolonged 
downturn,21 and so they did during the Great Recession in some 
states, such as Florida, but not, for instance, in California. There 
is a reason for this. Safeguards put in place—such as minimum 
lien-to-value ratios and reserve funds—after the bust of the early 
1990s in California effectively insulated many California 
districts. There is, therefore, a way to mitigate the risk of these 
districts enabling excessive speculation—other states, such as 
Florida, should copy the California requirements.22  
In developing the argument that there are financing 
problems caused by these districts, Odinet emphasizes that the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) turned against sublocal 
districts if the districts were established to finance solar panels 
and other energy-saving improvements. These districts were part 
of Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs.23 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 773–78. 
 20. Odinet seems aware of this concern but does not directly address it. Id. 
at 720 n.38. 
 21. Shanske, supra note 5, at 744–45. 
 22. See Robert W. Doty, The Readily Identifiable Riskiest Municipal 
Securities: Due Diligence Does Make a Difference, 32 MUN. FIN. J. 63, 70–75 
(2011) (contrasting default experiences in land-based financing in Florida and 
California). Note that this is not to say that there is not room for improvement 
with California Mello-Roos bonds. See, e.g., Keeley Webster, California Report 
Takes Aim at Mello-Roos Bonds, THE BOND BUYER (July 23, 2015, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/california-report-takes-aim-at-
mello-roos-bonds-1079926-1.html (“An Orange County, Calif. civil grand jury 
report criticized the oversight of $2.7 billion of debt issued by community 
facilities districts in the county.”). 
 23. Odinet, supra note 5, at 772. 
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Specifically, the FHFA declared that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac would stop purchasing mortgages of properties within PACE 
districts.24 This admittedly was a major event, essentially 
destroying a (potentially) worthwhile local experiment,25 and the 
super priority of these districts’ liens was a stated reason for this 
policy.  
Yet, it seems that Odinet gives this decision too much weight. 
After all, Fannie and Freddie did not stop buying the mortgages 
of the many homes in special districts generally, largely because 
these districts are a well-known mechanism for financing 
essential infrastructure. If a development district did not build 
the roads and the sewers, then a developer would have to build 
them and pass on a higher price to the home purchasers. In 
contrast, it seems that the FHFA was responding, perhaps 
hyperbolically, to policy and implementation concerns with the 
program.26 For instance, unlike sewers, solar panels are not 
considered essential by everyone, and so it is not clear what 
subsequent homeowners would think about taking on a special 
lien for solar panels. Also, though sewer lines do wear out, they 
do not become obsolete in the same way that solar panels do. In 
short, the FHFA seems to have been concerned about many other 
matters other than the simple “super lien” status.27 
                                                                                                     
 24. Id. 
 25. For the critique, see generally Prentiss Cox, Keeping PACE?: The Case 
Against Property Assessed Clean Energy Financing Programs, 83 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 83 (2011) (arguing that the theory behind PACE is fundamentally flawed). 
 26. See generally id. (providing a more in-depth exploration of this 
critique). 
 27. And the FHFA said as much: 
First liens established by PACE loans are unlike routine tax 
assessments and pose unusual and difficult risk management 
challenges for lenders, servicers and mortgage securities investors. 
The size and duration of PACE loans exceed typical local tax 
programs and do not have the traditional community benefits 
associated with taxing initiatives. 
Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy 
Retrofit Loan Programs (July 6, 2010), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Statement-on-Certain-
Energy-Retrofit-Loan-Programs.aspx (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). The federal government continues to be concerned with aspects of 
PACE programs beyond the super-lien issue. For instance, in its latest guidance 
on the issue, the federal government will insist that PACE programs not only 
have subordinate liens, but that the PACE programs provide adequate 
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The more powerful critiques of these districts are those 
addressed in this Response’s introduction, those based on broader 
considerations of political economy and justice.28 Odinet’s article 
explicitly and implicitly develops these critiques. For instance, 
Odinet discusses how the availability of these districts impel local 
governments and developers to chase one another, looking for 
supposed mutual win-wins, rather than search for projects that 
aid the common good.29 Odinet also describes the kind of gilded 
community that these districts are likely to finance30—these 
districts will likely increase segregation along multiple 
dimensions, not to mention sprawl. Odinet argues, reasonably, 
that a court should consider whether a district is serving an 
underserved community ex post when evaluating the priority of 
the district’s lien.31 This Response argues that legislatures should 
only permit such districts to advance broad social goals ex ante 
through, for instance, rules on the kinds of infrastructure than 
can be financed—for instance, not allowing districts to fund golf 
course projects.32   
There are two specific reasons this Response advocates an ex 
ante approach. First, if we followed Odinet, we would make the 
sublocal district lien subject to a balancing test, which would 
destabilize the rights of both the traditional lenders and district 
bondholders. That said, as argued above, we should not be overly 
concerned about traditional lenders. Furthermore, other reforms 
could lower the risk of default for these districts, so this clash of 
priorities should not be a regular occurrence, even during an 
                                                                                                     
consumer disclosures. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDANCE FOR USE OF 
FHA FINANCING ON HOMES WITH EXISTING PACE LIENS AND FLEXIBLE 
UNDERWRITING THROUGH ENERGY DEPARTMENT’S HOME ENERGY SCORE (2015).  
 28. See also Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future 
of the City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939, 941–46 (2013) (critiquing assessment 
districts). See generally Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323 
(2014) (providing a broader normative critique of micro-localism); Shanske, 
supra note 13 (same). 
 29. Odinet, supra note 5, at 777–78. 
 30. The district in the opening example is to be used to finance a tennis 
court, a golf course, and a swimming pool. Id. at 709–11; see also Shanske, supra 
note 13, at 665–70 (providing an actual example). 
 31. Odinet, supra note 5, at 785–88.  
 32. Shanske, supra note 13, at 707–08.  
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economic downturn. Thus, rights would be destabilized for little 
reason. Therefore, in order to achieve Odinet’s normative goals, 
an ex ante approach for assessing community benefit is more 
promising. That said, I do not see why both an ex ante and ex 
post solution could not be adopted at the same time. 
III. Conclusion 
One could argue that none of this is worth the trouble—that 
neither Odinet’s reform nor this Response’s proffered reform 
would be adequate. Even if subject to sensible restrictions, there 
will always be a likelihood that powerful interest groups will 
capture the use of sublocal district financing and push for its use 
in more speculative projects—or at the very least, projects that 
are normatively suboptimal. This might suggest dramatically 
limiting such financing structures or taking the final step and 
barring them outright. Such an approach would be a mistake for 
two important reasons—or rather, one reason, with a positive and 
a negative component. The negative component in particular has 
not been well articulated up until this point. 
First, the positive reason: the rationale for sublocal value 
capture finance often holds true and, because of this, such 
financings can serve as an important corrective for pathologies 
that might otherwise develop in local politics. Public 
infrastructure often disproportionately benefits a specific piece of 
private property. When this benefit is specified with reasonable 
precision, it not only allows for financing of infrastructure to 
occur through the assessment mechanism, but it also encourages 
a more frank evaluation of whether it should occur. For instance, 
most property owners would agree that general tax dollars should 
be used to improve the park across the street from their houses, 
but they may not feel the same way if they are specially assessed 
for that local improvement. If they do not agree with being 
specially assessed for the improvement, then maybe the project is 
not a good one. If most property owners support the assessment 
however, and the assessment succeeds, then perhaps the general 
park budget can be spent on a public pool for the whole town. 
Regarding the negative reason for why we need sublocal 
district financing, we should consider the scenario where a 
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property owner does not want an improvement but is assessed for 
one anyway. Though there are safeguards, in the end, the 
assessment is a coercive financing tool. If it were not, then it 
would not work properly. Very few projects command unanimous 
consent. This point about coercion underscores that these 
districts are just another governmental tool—not necessarily 
better or worse in the abstract. A local government could use 
general tax dollars to fund a park, use fees to fund a park, try to 
impose some kind of regulatory mandate to compel a private 
party to provide a park, so on and so forth. If the best tool is not 
available, then the government will use a different one if it can—
like trying to use a screwdriver to hammer in a nail.  
Using the wrong tool has costs—direct and indirect, 
predictable and unpredictable. In the simple scenario above, 
using the general park budget to fix up small neighborhood parks 
prevents funding citywide amenities. Or perhaps the local parks 
would not be fixed at all. If the park is not funded, then the direct 
cost is a value-enhancing amenity that could have funded itself. 
Various kinds of indirect costs are possible, such as the eventual 
need for more policing of a park that no one uses because it is 
rundown. On the other hand, if a sublocal park is funded with 
general tax dollars there are also costs, such as the political 
economy problem of different neighborhoods all clamoring for 
general tax dollars to improve their local park. A follow-on 
problem to this is that voters seem eventually to respond to 
misuse of instruments.  
There has been something of a natural experiment of this in 
California. I will tell the story, which is, of course, controversial 
in all respects, in outline. In 1978, via Proposition 13, the voters 
of California permanently reduced the local property tax, which 
had been the mainstay of local government.33 Without the ability 
to use the property tax as they had before, California local 
governments looked to other tools, particularly assessments, to 
fund projects that the voters apparently wanted and that had 
previously been funded with the property tax. In response to the 
perceived aggressive use of assessments, California voters made 
                                                                                                     
 33. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (incorporating Proposition 13). 
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it much harder to use assessments via Proposition 218 in 1996.34 
In the wake of Proposition 13, California local governments also 
turned more and more to fees. Proposition 26, passed in 2010, 
made it harder to impose fees.35 Whether the accusations of 
widespread abuse were fair in any of these cases is very much in 
doubt, but it is not controversial that California local 
governments felt compelled to use suboptimal mechanisms more 
frequently as their better options were taken away from them. 
The sad story of California’s systematic self-destruction of 
the traditional tools of local public finance illustrates the dynamic 
relationship between the various tools of public finance and local 
political economies. Sublocal financing is essential, if for no other 
reason than it is obviously appropriate in certain contexts. If a 
different financing expedient is used when a sublocal assessment 
district is the right tool, then the consequences will likely be 
worse than tolerating an occasional default, a developer making 
out like a bandit, or yet another way that the wealthy and 
powerful can feather their nests. This is because, in the end, we 
all benefit from a functional system of public finance. Thus, 
making incremental reforms to sublocal financing mechanisms, 
such that they are a little more equitable, is extremely 
worthwhile—hence the importance of Odinet’s contribution. 
                                                                                                     
 34. See id. arts. XIIIC and XIIID (incorporating Proposition 218).  
 35. See id. arts. XIIIA, § 3 and XIIIC, § 1 (incorporating Proposition 26). 
